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Abstract 
 In this paper, we develop a structural auction model and quantify the effects of policy 
measures aiming to enhance competition in the Japanese retail power market. We employ a 
theoretical model that incorporates asymmetries between the incumbent and entrants in 
terms of both the cost and information structures, where the costs of the former are assumed 
common knowledge, and empirically estimate the structural parameters characterizing their 
cost distributions using public power procurement data. We then conduct counterfactual 
simulations to quantify two competition-promoting policy measures: a bid preference 
program for entrants, and an increase in the number of potential bidders. We take a 
parametric approach to estimate the structural model successfully in contrast to a 
nonparametric approach that previous studies took. Our simulation results show that these 
procompetitive measures would barely increase participation by potential entrants but would 
elicit more aggressive incumbent bidding behavior. Further, a modest bid-preferential rate 
would improve welfare and reduce the probability of realizing inefficient allocations 
associated with a costly winning bidder. 
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1. Introduction 
There has long been heavy regulation of utilities of all forms in most countries. 
Accordingly, in the early stages of deregulation, huge incumbents, which had previously 
monopolized regional and sometimes national markets under regulated regimes, typically 
play a dominant role alongside just a few smaller entrants. In evidence, Corfe and Gicheva 
(2017) report very high concentration ratios and Herfindahl–Hirschman indices (HHIs) for 
fixed and mobile phone, broadband, electricity, and gas services in the UK. There is also high 
industry concentration among airlines, not only in the US with just four major carriers, but 
in other countries with industries comprised of legacy and low-cost carriers (see Fu et al. 
(2015) for China and Sun (2017) for Korea). Similarly, the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (2015) reports high concentration rates for the three major suppliers in 
retail electricity and gas markets in EU member states. In this regard, Japan is no exception, 
with its Electricity and Gas Market Surveillance Commission (2018) showing that the nine 
Japanese regional retail markets have extremely high HHIs and are comparable with those 
in the most concentrated countries of France, Latvia, Estonia, and Croatia. 
In 1995, Japan initiated a series of regulatory reforms to shift toward a more market-
oriented power industry by deregulating entry into the wholesale power market. Retail 
market deregulation commenced in the market segment for large industrial and commercial 
customers using 2,000 kilowatt (kW) or more of ultra-high voltage (UHV) power. Since then, 
the scope of deregulation has gradually expanded to other middle-sized customers using 500 
kW or more of high voltage (HV) power in 2004, and again to those using 50 kW or more in 
2005. These deregulated market segments covered more than 60% of the total power demand 
in 2006, with deregulation eventually reaching all customers in 2016. 
Initially, new entrants to this market mainly started their business using third-party 
power plants while developing their own plants, eventually accounting for a 5% share of the 
deregulated retail market in 2014. However, because of their limited supply capacity, 
entrants typically focus on large customers using UHV power in large cities, especially in the 
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service area of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). These entrants engage in power 
procurement auctions very actively and exploit their cheaper supply costs to win out over 
incumbents in auctions for large customers once they decide to participate in the auction. 
The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (2004, 2006) examined auction data 
for power supply to government and other public entities in Japan and found that with just 
a few exceptions, the average power charges in auctions with multiple bidders were about 
0.7 yen per kilowatt-hour (kWh) lower in auctions with a single bidder, where only one 
incumbent participates. 1  Problematically, we cannot attribute this difference in power 
charges solely to the participation of entrants, because the entrants first endogenously decide 
entry and only then bid after considering the impact of the auction attributes for their profits. 
For instance, Hattori (2010) found that entrants were more likely to participate in potentially 
profitable auctions with lower load factors, larger contract demand, and UHV power supply, 
using auction data for 2004–2006.2 Hosoe and Takagi (2012) concluded that participation by 
entrants lowered power charges by about 0.48 yen/kWh in auctions on average while 
controlling for the endogeneity bias caused by their participation decisions. However, their 
closed-form models only describe bidder diversity (or the asymmetry between them) with 
dummy explanatory variables. 
There are two major sources of asymmetry between an incumbent and entrants in 
the retail power market. One is their business activities, including the types and sizes of 
facilities they possess, their major customers, and their scale of business. These are often 
                                                     
1 The average power charge divides the winning bids (in yen) by the power demand (in kWh). Unless 
otherwise noted, we simply refer to this as the power charge in our study. 
2 The (annual average) load factor is defined as follows: Load factor (%) = planned power demand (kWh) 
÷ [contract demand (kW) × 365 (days) × 24 (hours) × contract period (years)] × 100 (%). Given total 
power demand, a lower load factor implies that capacity is more likely to be idle and thus customers 
are costly to serve. 
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readily observable and related to the difference in cost structures between market players. 
The other is institutional asymmetry in information structure. Here, the incumbents have 
long served the market and usually disclosed their cost information (e.g., plant portfolios and 
fuel consumption and power generation by power station) in detail under the previous 
regulatory regime. 
With this information, other players can precisely infer the supply costs of 
incumbents for individual auctions, such as in Hosoe (2015) using fuel efficiency data. In 
contrast, there is little disclosure of the information about entrants, such as the capacities of 
their third-party suppliers and their own new plants, their deals in the power exchange 
market, and through bilateral contracts. Accordingly, most information about entrants is 
private and most information about an incumbent is common knowledge. This type of 
asymmetry leads to different actions taken by the incumbent and entrants. 
To model procurement auctions with such highly asymmetric players, Brendstrup 
and Paarsch (2004) and Suzuki (2010) applied a nonparametric approach to estimating 
bidders’ cost distributions, based on earlier work by Guerre et al. (2000). After estimating the 
bidders’ cost densities, they obtained the optimal bidding functions as numerical solutions of 
the boundary value problem for the partial differential equations, as derived from the first-
order conditions of the bidders. 
This nonparametric approach has an advantage in that it could identify the bidders’ 
cost distributions without specifying their parametric functional form, rather through the 
densities and distributions of the bid data. Nevertheless, at the cost of flexibility in the 
functional form, nonparametric estimations of densities suffer from possible biases or 
inconsistencies near the data endpoints. See, for example, Hickman and Hubbard (2015). In 
addition, it is widely recognized that the numerical methods used for solving boundary value 
problems are inherently unstable, especially near boundary points (Fibich and Gavish, 2011). 
In general, the estimation biases and numerical instabilities inherent in the 
nonparametric estimation and numerical solution methods of partial differential equations 
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affect the estimated auction outcomes: namely, winning bids, profits, participation 
probabilities, and inefficiencies. Those numerical difficulties then deteriorate the preciseness 
of the counterfactual simulations using the estimated auction outcomes. Eventually, Suzuki 
(2011) reinstated participation costs in the auctions as in Levin and Smith (1994). Her 
counterfactual simulations, like those of Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), showed that the 
number of participants would double (from four to nine bidders) with a 20% preference rate 
for bids by entrants. However, in her estimations, the participation costs for an average 
auction were some 4.2 million yen (5.3% of the winning bids of that auction) and these appear 
much too large for procurement auctions held regularly every year.3 
In this study, we follow the theoretical frameworks in Vickrey (1961) and Martínez-
Pardina (2006) and develop a parametric model for power procurement auctions, whereby 
the incumbent and entrants are heterogeneous in their cost distributions and information 
structure. In contrast to the nonparametric approach of earlier studies, we take a parametric 
approach, where we prespecify the functional forms of bidders’ cost distributions. We also 
assume the asymmetries not only in the cost distributions of the incumbent and entrants, 
but also in the cost information disclosed to other participants. Incorporating these into the 
theoretical model, we explicitly obtain the parametric bidding functions of each participant, 
depending on common knowledge. For our estimation, we use data for nearly 800 power 
procurement auctions held in the early stage of the retail market deregulation in TEPCO’s 
service area. Taking advantage of the structural approach, we then conduct counterfactual 
policy simulations to demonstrate the effects of procompetitive policies on the auction 
participant behavior and market outcomes, including power charges and the efficiency of 
resource allocation. These provide clear quantitative policy implications for the drastic 
                                                     
3 The attributes of the average auction in Suzuki’s (2011) simulations are 3,200 kW of maximum power 
use, 9.3 million kWh of planned power demand, 80 million yen for the winning bid, and a 33% load 
factor. 
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regulatory reforms following the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Disaster in March 2011. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic 
statistics of our auction sample, and Section 3 presents Martínez-Pardina’s (2006) theoretical 
model for power procurement auctions assuming asymmetry in player costs and information 
structures. Section 4 describes our estimation method for the structural auction model as 
based on indirect inference. Section 5 discusses our estimation and policy simulation results, 
examining how procompetitive policies affect the behavior of both bidders and market 
outcomes. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Power Procurement Auction Data 
Our sample comprises auctions for power procurement by government and other 
public entities in TEPCO’s service area. We use auction data for supply in 2009 and 2010 
that disclose whether entrants bid.4 As shown by Figure 2.1, the power charges [total bid 
amount (yen) ÷ planned power demand (kWh)], observed as winning bids, exhibit a 
downward-sloping curve reflecting the two-tier tariff system, based on capacity and demand 
charges. Following Hosoe and Takagi (2012), we use the subsample of auctions with load 
factors of 10% or more partly because the power charges in auctions with load factor below 
10% are highly volatile given idiosyncratic factors and partly because the market segment 
with load factors around 20–60% are more competitive given the active participation of 
entrants. The resulting sample size is 793 auctions, consisting of 216 UHV auctions and 577 
HV auctions. 
 
                                                     
4 In Japan, there is no full disclosure of the results of power procurement auctions. For example, losing 
bids are not publicly available. The names of bidding losers are also not necessarily reported; only the 
number or presence of losers. As the information about the presence of losers is most often available, 
we rely on this information to provide as many observations as possible. 
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Figure 2.1: Winning Bids and Load Factors 
 
 
Our auction data provide details of contracts and winning bids, including the site 
name, supply voltage (V), power demand (kWh), maximum load (kW), winning bids (yen), 
and names of winners. However, we cannot necessarily detect either the losers’ names or 
their bids, but we can observe whether there were multiple bidders. Because TEPCO bids in 
almost all auctions as the default bidder, the observation of multiple bidders immediately 
implies entrant participation. 5  The descriptive statistics summarize winning bids and 
entrant participation by market segment (Table 2.1). In multiple-bidder cases, the number 
of bidders (including the default bidder of the incumbent) is at most three. Entrants very 
actively participate in the market segments with load factors less than 50% and usually beat 
the incumbent.  
However, from the descriptive statistics we cannot obtain any clear evidence that 
entrant participation always lowers winning bids. For example, while the winning bids in 
                                                     
5  In our sample period, TEPCO withdrew from some auctions because it could not meet the 
qualification for “green contracts”, which required a low carbon emission level. We omit these irregular 
samples from our analysis. 
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multiple-bidder auctions are lower than in single-bidder auctions in the market segment with 
load factors of 50–70%, this does not hold for UHV auctions with load factors of 30–50%. This 
indicates that entrants focus on those market segments where they are competent and choose 
bids low enough, but not too low, to beat the incumbent by exploiting information about the 
incumbent’s costs and inferred bid patterns. 
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Based on the site name, we categorized samples into several facility types we expect 
to correlate with the profitability of auctions: namely, office buildings, garbage-disposal 
facilities, school buildings, market sites, water and sewage plants, road facilities, hospitals, 
factories, and others, as detailed in Table 2.2. In what follows, we use data on the winning 
bids, a multiple-bidder dummy, a facility type dummy, load factor, supply voltage (UHV/HV), 
maximum load, and power demand for our structural estimation. We focus on the samples 
Subtotal
10–30% 30–50% 50–70% 70%–
Subtotal
10–30% 30–50% 50–70% 70%– Total
Ultra-High Voltage Sites
Winning Bid  14.57 17.81 14.38 12.81 12.29 13.36  -- 14.07 13.69 12.55 14.18
 (St. dev.) [yen/kWh] (2.57) (3.74) (1.05) (0.58) (0.60) (1.09)  (1.00) (1.05) (0.62) (2.28)
Power Demand   20.62 8.00 12.71 49.3 27.02 27.32  -- 16.35 27.19 31.37 22.79
 (St. dev.)  [million kWh] (59.50) (8.10) (5.85) (123.87) (11.43) (29.17) (13.26) (36.34) (15.15) (51.75)
Supply Capacity  4.26 3.57 3.55 6.71 4.01 4.46  -- 4.21 4.41 4.61 4.32
 (St. dev.) [thousand kW] (6.24) (1.85) (1.47) (12.89) (1.63) (3.35)  (3.45) (3.85) (2.19) (5.47)
Bidders 2.91 2.76 3.27 2.39 2.36 1.00  -- 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.3
 (St. dev.) (1.01) (1.04) (0.98) (0.79) (0.48) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.22)
Contact Period 1.12 1.24 1.04 1.23 1.00 1.04  -- 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.09
 (St. dev.) [year] (0.41) (0.57) (0.20) (0.61) 0.00 (0.26)  (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.37)
Green Contracts 0.59 0.48 0.67 0.52 0.55 0.4  -- 0.38 0.46 0.30 0.53
Awarded to an Entrant  0.79 0.97 0.95 0.48 0.18 0.06  -- 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.56
Observations 146 29 75 31 11 70 0 8 39 23 216
High Voltage Sites
Winning Bid 17.33 18.99 16.23 14.48 14.52 15.81 19.29 16.03 14.53 13.62 16.89
 (St. dev.) [yen/kWh] (2.44) (2.20) (1.44) (0.83) (1.89) (2.50) (2.32) (1.46) (0.82) (1.25) (2.56)
Power Demand 3.51 2.90 3.30 6.62 8.2 3.7 0.87 2.6 5.17 6.16 3.56
 (St. dev.)  [million kWh] (5.66) (6.88) (3.09) (6.37) (6.32) (3.14) (0.97) (2.29) (3.10) (2.60) (5.06)
Supply Capacity  0.95 1.04 0.84 1.07 0.99 0.78 0.41 0.71 1.02 0.91 0.90
 (St. dev.) [thousand kW] (1.12) (1.50) (0.58) (0.64) (0.47) (0.58) (0.44) (0.59) (0.60) (0.40) (0.99)
Bidders  2.89 2.99 2.86 2.62 2.5 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.34
 (St. dev.) (1.11) (1.28) (0.91) (0.94) (1.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.27)
Contact Period  1.14 1.15 1.12 1.12 1.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10
 (St. dev.) [year] (0.43) (0.46) (0.38) (0.39) (0.70) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.37)
Green Contracts 0.54 0.67 0.43 0.32 0.8 0.45 0.86 0.54 0.32 0.06 0.52
Awarded to an Entrant 0.91 0.99 0.94 0.47 0.5 0.07 0.25 0.02 0 0.03 0.67
Observations 409 191 174 34 10 168 36 48 53 31 577
w/ Participation of Entrants w/o Participation of Entrants
w/ Participation of Entrants w/o Participation of Entrants
  Page 8 
for power supply in 2009–2010 to avoid impacts of idiosyncratic shocks in other years, such 
as the 2007 oil price hike and TEPCO’s nuclear power shutdowns caused by two huge 
earthquakes in 2007 and 2011. 
The number of potential bidders for a specific auction is one of the key variables in 
auction models but is neither observable nor identifiable in our data set. Accordingly, we 
must guess the number of potential bidders based on the available circumstantial evidence. 
Many entrants have registered for the retail power business (79 firms at the end of 2012) but 
only a few actively participate in power procurement auctions. Table 2.1 and the finding by 
Hattori (2010) suggest that the number of actual bidders is, at most, 2–3 on average. Our 
dataset shows that eight and ten entrants participated in at least either one UHV or one HV 
auction, respectively. Following Li and Zheng (2009) and Li and Zhang (2015), we take 
account of the above observations of actual bidders and assume different numbers of potential 
bidders for subsamples in each market segment, as defined by load factor and supply voltage. 
For the numbers of potential bidders, we assume ten (eight) bidders for HV (UHV) auctions 
with load factors lower than 50%, nine (seven) bidders for those with 50–70% load factors, 
and eight (six) bidders for those with factor load exceeding 70%.6 
                                                     
6 We do not find any significant differences in the estimation results even when we alternatively use 
the same numbers from six to ten for all the market segments in our robustness tests. See the Appendix 
for details. 
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Table 2.2: Auctions by Facility Type and Market Segment 
 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
Following Martínez-Pardina (2006), we outline a theoretical model with asymmetry 
between the incumbent (i.e., TEPCO) and entrants in terms of both the cost distributions and 
information structure. In our context, the significance of asymmetry is twofold. The first lies 
in the asymmetry of the supply costs, which reflects differences in the fuel and facility 
portfolios. The second type of asymmetry in information structure is the key feature of our 
auction model, whereby we assume the incumbent’s cost is common knowledge in an auction, 
whereas the entrants’ costs are private information. 
 
10–30% 30–50% 50–70% 70%– Total
Ultra-High Voltage Sites
Office Buildings 8 46 15 4 73
Garbage 12 2  14
School  5  5
Factory 1  1
Market  1 4 5
Water and Sewage 3 3 34 28 68
Road 1 1 1  3
Hospital  5 7 12
Others 4 20 9 2 35
Total 29 83 70 34 216
High Voltage Sites  
Office Buildings 128 90 16 9 243
Garbage 5 3 2  10
School 30 24  54
Factory     0
Market 2 3  5
Water and Sewage 39 35 33 26 133
Road 1 7 1 1 10
Hospital  20 20 40
Others 22 40 15 5 82
Total 227 222 87 41 577
Load Factor
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3.1 Setup 
In our model, there is one incumbent firm and n−1 potential entrants with symmetric 
cost distributions. When potential bidders participate and bid in an auction, they are termed 
actual bidders. We assume that the cost level of the incumbent 1c , the number of potential 
bidders n, and their cost distribution functions are common knowledge. We denote 
   ICqcGcG ;11   ( 1( )g c ) and    ENii qcGcF ;  ( ( )if c ) as the cost distribution (density) 
functions of the incumbent and entrant, where ic  denotes costs of the i-th potential bidder 
and ICq  and ENq  are exogenous variables that influence the cost distribution function of 
the incumbent and entrant, respectively. These functions have support in the interval [ , ]c c . 
In Martínez-Pardina’s (2006) procurement game, an auctioneer first announces the 
details of the power procurement contracts for a first-price sealed-bid auction, such as total 
power demand (kWh), maximum load (kW), and contract duration (often one year). Entrants 
can then infer the incumbent’s costs 1c  needed to fulfill the contract. Next, entrants 
examine their own costs ic  ( 2i ) and profits for the contract and decide whether to bid. 
Finally, the actual bidders choose their optimal bids, given the incumbent’s costs and the 
number of potential bidders n. The incumbent randomly decides its bid along a bidding 
distribution ( )H x  with an upper limit b  and a lower limit b (i.e., a mixed strategy), as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium 
 
Source: Adopted from Martínez-Pardina (2006) and modified by the authors. 
Note: IC and EN denote incumbent and entrant, respectively. χ denotes the cost level of 
entrants with the optimal bid 𝑏. 
 
Depending on the costs of the incumbent and entrants, three different competition 
regimes arise: 
 
 A: Competition only among entrants 
 B: Competition between the incumbent and entrants 
 C: No competition (only the incumbent participates) 
 
The parameter   in Figure 3.1 plays a crucial role in switching among these three regimes. 
  is the threshold cost level of entrants, where their optimal bid is equal to the lower bound 
of the incumbent’s bid b . If entrants’ costs are below  , entrants are sufficiently 
competitive and always beat the incumbent and therefore compete with each other (region 
RA). Note that region RA, where only entrants can win, disappears when the incumbent’s cost 
c1 is lower than the threshold cˆ . The upper limit b  of the incumbent’s bidding distribution 
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( )H x  divides the region RB from the region RC. In the region RC, entrants have no cost 
advantage over the incumbents and thus do not participate. 
Starting with the profit functions of bidders, we derive the parameters characterizing 
the mixed-strategy equilibrium, namely cˆ , b , b, and   by following Martínez-Pardina 
(2006). In this study, we extend the original model by adding a device that describes a 
preferential treatment for entrants so that we can conduct counterfactual policy simulations 
later. In this extension, we discount by 1   the bids submitted by entrants and compare 
them with the incumbent’s bid to determine the winner. That is, when the incumbent bids 
x in an auction, an entrant wins by submitting a bid less than (1 )x   . 
 
3.2 Model Summary and Welfare Measures 
 The mixed-strategy equilibrium of the model is characterized by the following system 
of equations: 
• The cost threshold of the incumbent cˆ : 
 
 
 
1
1
2 ˆ ˆ( ) 1 ((1 ) ( ))1ˆ = ˆ( 2) 1 ((1 ) ( ))
n
n
n c b c F b c
c
n F b c




     
      
 
ˆ1 1 ((1 ) ( ))ˆ ˆ( ) = ,ˆ( 1) (1 ) ((1 ) ( ))
F b cb c c
n f b c

 
         
 where 
 
ˆ1 1 ((1 ) ( ))ˆ ˆ( ) = .ˆ( 1) (1 ) ((1 ) ( ))
F b cb c c
n f b c

 
         
 
• The upper bound bid of the incumbent b : 
 1
1 1 ((1 ) )= ( 1) (1 ) ((1 ) )
F bb c
n f b

 
        . 
  Page 13 
 
• The lower bound bid of the incumbent b  and the cost threshold of entrants  : 
- If > c , ( , )b   satisfies the following: 
 1 11 1{1 ( )} ( ) = {1 ((1 ) )} ( ),n nF b c F b b c           
 1( 2) ( ) = ( 1) ( (1 ) )n b n b c         . 
 
- If = c , the lower bound is defined as: 
 11 1= {1 ((1 ) )} ( )nb c F b b c       . 
  
• The bid distribution (density) of the incumbent ( )H x  ( ( )h x ): 
  ( ) = ( ) exp ( ) ,xbh x x y dy     
where 
 1
11 1
1
1 2 1( ) = .11 1 {1 ((1 ) )}1
n
nx
n x cb cx F F b
x c




                
 
 
• The bidding functions of an entrant ( ), ( )A Bb c b c : 
- If <ic   (region RA): 
 
2 2
2 2
{1 ( )} {1 ( )}( ) = ((1 ) ).{1 ( )} {1 ( )}
n
n
ci
A i i n n
i i
F y dy Fb c c b
F c F c

  
 
 
       

 
  
- If ic b    (region RB), according to (7), 
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1
1 1
1 ((1 ) )( ) = (1 ) ( ) .1 ( )
n
B i
i
F bb c c b c
F c

              
 
  
- If >ic b  (region RC), 
 No entrant participation. 
 
We solve this system given the cost distributions F(c) and G(c) and the number of 
potential bidders n . 
Based on the equilibrium solution, we can evaluate the auction results and derive 
welfare measures for producers (i.e., auction participants) and consumers. The expected 
profit of the incumbent is: 
                

 
 c
c
b
b
n
IC cdGdxcxhcxcx
ccbcbF 111
1
111
1 |11  . 
The expected profit of entrants is: 
                 


 



 
c
c c
b
nB
B
nAEN cdGcdFccb
cbHcdFccbˆ 1
**
1,1
**
*
**
1,1
**
1

  , 
where , 1( )k nF c   is the distribution function of the k -th smallest order statistic of the 
sample from F  of size N  and density is denoted as , 1( )k nf c  . The expected consumer cost 
(i.e., the expected winning bid) C is defined as follows: 
            


 


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
 c
c
b
b
n cdGdxcxh
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cbcbFxC 11
1
11
1 |11   
  1, 1 1, 1 1ˆ
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),1
c b B
A n B nc c
b cb c dF c H b c dF c dG c

 

     
 
             
because the winning entrant must have the lowest cost among potential entrants. The first 
term C is the expected payment to the incumbent; the second is the payment to the (lowest-
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cost) entrant. We assume the electricity supplied by the incumbent and entrants to have the 
same level of quality and thus yield the same consumer benefits. Therefore, a positive change 
in consumer cost is equivalent to a negative change in consumer surplus. 
The social cost S is the sum of the expected producer and consumer cost: 
           
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  1, 1 1, 1 1ˆ
( )( ) ( ) ( ).1
c b B
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b cc dF c H c dF c dG c

 

     
 
             
We interpret this measure as a proxy of social welfare for the same reason as the 
abovementioned consumer cost and surplus. 
 
4. Estimation Method 
Figure 3.1 shows that the model contains several unknown parameters: b , b , cˆ, and 
. These can be computed by solving the abovementioned system of simultaneous equations, 
given the incumbent’s and entrants’ cost distribution functions, )(G  and )(F , 
respectively, which can be determined by estimating the parameters of these distribution 
functions. We assume that costs are log-normally distributed random variables and relate to 
the auction-specific variables using the moments of the cost distributions. We discuss the 
estimation method of the unknown parameters while specifying the structural model. 
 
4.1 Estimation Model 
Denote the cost level of the i-th entrant in the -th auction as ,ic . The costs are 
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assumed to be independently and identically log-normally distributed among entrants:7 
 .,1,2,=,,2,3,=),)(,(~log 2, LniNc ENENi     
Then, the density is: 
 ,)(
)log(exp)(2
1=);( 2
2
,
2
,
, 


  EN
EN
i
EN
i
ENi
c
c
cf



 

θ  
where the mean EN  and the variance 2)( EN  of the log-cost are related to the individual 
auction-specific variable vector x , such that: 
   1,11,10=   KKEN xx  , 
 }.{exp= 1,11,10     KENKENENEN xx   
 Similarly, the cost of the incumbent is assumed to be log-normally distributed,
  2,1 ,~log ICICNc   , where IC  and 2)( IC  are: 
   1,11,10=   KICKICICIC xx  , 
 }.{exp= 1,11,10     KICKICICIC xx   
For notational simplicity, the structural parameters to be estimated are stacked into a single 
vector )',',','(=)','(=' ENENICICENIC γβγβθθθ . 
                                                     
7 Instead of this simplifying assumption, we could assume unobserved auction-specific heterogeneity 
for cost distributions, as described by Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003), closed-form parametric 
models by assuming the other parametric distribution with unobserved heterogeneity, or some mixing 
distribution with general, nonparametric heterogeneity, as described by Heckman and Singer (1984). 
Given that these have some drawbacks in interpretation, identification, and computation, our chosen 
approach leads to reasonable goodness of fit and is useful for our simulation purposes. 
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As the auction-specific variable influencing the means and variances of the cost, we 
employ the level and the inverse of load factor (%), the power demand (kWh), and the number 
of actual bidders, as well as dummy variables for 2010 and “green contract” auctions.8 
Following Campo et al. (2003), we use the number of actual bidders to control for the 
auction-specific heterogeneity. As the number of actual bidders is a sufficient statistic for 
unobserved auction-specific heterogeneity, by conditioning this number we can estimate the 
structural (infinite-dimensional) parameters without the effect of the unobserved 
heterogeneity. Although we often expect the power demand variable (kWh) to control for the 
scale of demand, it does not exhibit either significant effects on the cost distributions or clear 
improvements in the goodness of fit, as demonstrated in Figure 4.1. Therefore, we report the 
estimation results excluding this variable. 
 
Figure 4.1: Goodness of Fit of Models with and without the Power Demand Variable 
 
 
                                                     
8 Only bidders that meet a certain low-carbon emission qualification can participate in green contract 
auctions. 
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To estimate the structural parameters, we employ a simulation-assisted minimum 
chi-square method or an indirect inference method (Gourieroux et al., 1993). We do not derive 
the likelihood function under our parametric assumptions because formidable complexities 
in the likelihood function are caused by the incompleteness of the data, which have missing 
information about losing bids and censoring of the nonparticipating bids, and the 
requirements of multiple numerical integrations to evaluate the likelihood. Our alternative 
approach with the simulation-based method can reduce this burden and ensure feasible 
inferences. We discuss the simulation-based estimation method below. 
 
4.2 Indirect Inference and Auxiliary Models 
Indirect inference investigates the structural parameter θ in the structural model 
through the parameter ξ  in an auxiliary model. As this auxiliary model captures key 
characteristics of the data but does not always represent the data generation process itself, 
it is a misspecified model with some explanatory power for the data. The parameter vector ξ  
is a device to infer the structural parameter θ , known as an auxiliary parameter to 
distinguish it from the structural parameter. Indirect inference provides a level of 
correspondence with the estimated auxiliary parameter if an auxiliary model reasonably 
captures the characteristics of the data. The original sample implicitly depends on the true 
structural parameter 0θ ; thus, the auxiliary parameter estimate using the original sample 
depends on the structural parameter in the form )(ˆ=ˆ 0θξξ . When we have a sample 
generated from the structural model with the other structural parameter value θ , the 
auxiliary parameter from the sample can be written as )(~=~ θξξ  . Whereas the auxiliary 
parameter ξˆ is estimated from the original sample, the auxiliary parameter ξ~  would be 
obtained from the artificial sample with the structural parameter value θ . If the vector ξˆ  
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is nearly equal to ξ~ , it is naturally conjectured that the vector θ  is also close to . 
Let us outline the estimation procedure. We contrast two series of observations: the 
winning price y  and the dummy variable indicating entrant participation d  with their 
solutions from the structural model. We select an auxiliary model to capture features of these 
endogenous variables, as discussed below. 
1. Given the structural parameter value θ  and the auction-specific variables L 1=}{ x , 
we set the cost distributions of the incumbent and entrants. We simulate the costs 
Lr
n
rr ccc 1=
)(
,
)(
2,
)(
1, },,,{    and solve the structural model. Consequently, we have a 
sample of the winning bid and the participation dummy Lrr dy 1=
)()( },{   
corresponding to . 
2. Using the generated sample Lrr dy 1=
)()( },{  , we estimate the auxiliary model and 
obtain the auxiliary parameter estimates . 
3. By repeating the above steps for r = 1, 2, …, R times, we obtain a sequence of auxiliary 
parameter estimates Rr
r
1=
)( }{ξ . We denote their average value by . 
4. We search the structural parameter value θ  such that the simulation-based 
auxiliary parameter Rξ  is sufficiently close to the auxiliary parameter ξ  from the 
original sample. 
In selecting auxiliary models, computational simplicity is as important as the explanatory 
power of the data. There have been several auxiliary models proposed. For example, Rossi 
and Santucci de Magistris (2018) discussed the identification issues in stochastic volatility 
models using simple linear time series models as auxiliary models. Gallant and Tauchen 
(1996) proposed the use of a semi-nonparametric density function for an auxiliary model. 
Their auxiliary model flexibly captures features of the data-generating process and can 
provide an efficient estimator (the efficient method of moments). However, the literature does 
0θ
θ
)(rξ
)(
1=
1= rR
rR
R ξξ 
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not explore well the inclusion of exogenous variables in semi-nonparametric density functions. 
In contrast, our approach is easy to implement by employing a switching regression model to 
describe the participating behavior and the winning bid determination.9 Hosoe and Takagi 
(2012) indeed demonstrated that the switching regression model for the winning bid and the 
entrant participation dummy variable performed well in light of the goodness of fit. 
 The auxiliary model is: 
 Ljuy jj ,1,2,=0,1,=,'=,  φx , 
 0}>'{=  vd ψzl , 
where }{l  is an indicator function that returns unity (or zero) when the condition in the 
parentheses holds (or does not hold) (i.e., one or more entrants decide(s) (not) to participate 
in the auction  ). The suffix 1(0)=j  indicates the status that entrants (do not) participate 
in the auction. The distribution of the error term is assumed as follows: 
  
where the auxiliary parameters are stacked into a vector )',',',','(= 0101 ψηηφφξ . 
The switching regression model can capture the two aspects of the power 
procurement auctions. First, the participation decision of entrants is modeled by a binary 
response model. Second, determinants of the winning bid are investigated by a regression 
model. Comparing their cost levels ic  with the upper bound bid by the incumbent b , 
entrants decide whether to participate or not, as described in the binary choice model. The 
winning bids in the region RA (i.e., without entrant participation) possess the features of the 
                                                     
9 Li and Zhang (2015) took a similar approach. They used the auxiliary model with two equations: a 
count data regression equation for explaining the number of actual bidders and a linear regression 
equation for examining the determinants of all submitted bids. 
  0,1,=,10 0}'{2exp=,, ,,, jNvu jjjj 


 



 ηwΣΣ0 

 
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incumbent’s bid distribution )(H . In contrast, the winning bids in the regions RB and RC 
(i.e., with entrants’ participation) embody the features of both types’ bid distributions. 
In the auxiliary model, we analyze the dependent variable for each regime in the 
switching regression to summarize the sample information into the auxiliary parameter 
estimates, with which we can identify the structural parameters in the bid distributions of 
the incumbent and entrants. 
The log-likelihood function of the auxiliary model is given as: 
 





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  dd LL , 
where x  is an auction-specific variable vector, comprising the load factor, the inverse of 
the load factor, a green contract dummy, a time dummy for 2010, and power demand. The 
standard deviations ,j   in the likelihood function are parameterized as 
Ljjj ,1,2,=0,1,=},'{exp=,  ηw , where  comprises the load factor, the inverse 
of the load factor, and power demand. We also assume that that the determinants of 
participation are included in z  (load factor, green contract dummy, time dummy for 2010, 
and power demand). Therefore, there are 21 parameters in the auxiliary model for the UHV 
auction sample. Alternatively, the number of parameters for the HV auction sample is 18, 
obtained by deleting the inverse of the load factor from x  and .10 
                                                     
10  As for variable selection in the auxiliary model, we use the information criterion proposed by 
Barigozzi et al. (2015). 
w
w
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4.3 Estimating Structural Parameters 
 This section addresses the estimation method of the structural parameters 
)','(=' PPSGEU θθθ . The auxiliary estimate from the original sample is: 
  
Given a structural parameter vector θ  and the auction-specific covariates, we 
generate an r -th simulation-based sample, Lrr dy 1=
)()( }),(),({  xθθ . Using this simulated 
sample, we compute the r -th auxiliary estimate: 
 ).),(),(;(maxarg=)(ˆ )()(
1=
)(


xθθξθξ
ξ
rr
L
r
L dyl  
We repeat the above steps R  times, and obtain a sequence of the simulation-based 
auxiliary estimates, )}(ˆ,),(ˆ),(ˆ{ )((2)(1) θξθξθξ RLLL   and its mean: 
 ).(ˆ1=)( )(
1=
, θξθξ rL
R
r
RL R  
We choose the structural parameter Lθˆ  to minimize the following quadratic form 
with a weighting matrix Ω : 
 , ,ˆ ˆˆ = ( ) = ( ( )) ( ( )).arg argmin minL L L L R L L RS  θ θθ θ ξ ξ θ Ω ξ ξ θ  
LΩ , the optimal choice of the weighting matrix, is given as follows: 
 ,= 1 LLLL ABAΩ   
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There remains an identification problem. Let θ  be a 1K  vector, and ξ  be a 
1J  vector. The necessary conditions for the identification of the structural parameters are 
).,,;(maxarg=);},,({maxarg=ˆ
1=
1= 

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L
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that KJ  , and that the rank of the Jacobian of the probability limit of the auxiliary ξˆ 
with respect to the structural parameters is of full column rank K  (Gourieroux et al. (1993)). 
Therefore, it follows that we attain identification if we successfully obtain the covariance 
matrix estimate. 
Given that these identification conditions are satisfied, the asymptotic distribution 
of the structural parameter estimator is: 
 ,]ˆ[1,)ˆ( 0 

  L
d
L R
RNL θ0θθ   
and the estimator of the asymptotic covariance ]ˆ[ Lθ  is given as: 
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dyl
L
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L
LLLLLL
 , 
where )ˆ(, LRL θξ  is a simulated auxiliary parameter estimate given the structural parameter 
vector Lθˆ . Note that the asymptotic covariance can be rewritten as: 
  
Along with the usual minimum chi-square methods, the model is overidentified if 
KJ > . The minimized criterion function normalized by LRR  )/(1  asymptotically 
follows a chi-squared distribution with KJ   degrees of freedom under the maintained 
assumption that the structural model is correctly specified: 
 .)ˆ(1
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 θ  
In their computation, we note that the global minimum is difficult to identify using 
derivative-based optimization algorithms because the criterion function )(θL  features a 
number of local minima and nonsmooth points. Therefore, we employ a simulated annealing 
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method to find the global minimum (e.g., Goffe and Ferrier (1994)).11 We use DeinoMPI 1.1.0 
and Ox 6.2 + oxmpi (Doornik (2010)) for estimation, and R 3.1.1 (R Development Core Team 
(2010)) for various policy simulation implementations. 
 
5. Results of Model Estimation and Policy Simulations 
5.1 Estimation Results 
Table 5.1 provides the estimation results for the structural parameters, with R =20 
simulation replications for calculating the criterion function.12 Based on these estimated 
parameters, we can recover the incumbent’s cost level in each market segment as exemplified 
in Table 5.2. 
 
                                                     
11 Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) proposed an alternative estimation strategy for simulation-based 
estimators based upon a Markov chain Monte Carlo method. We do not use their method as we find it 
slow and the results are sensitive to the starting points (see Kormilitsina and Nekipelov (2012)). 
12 Although the asymptotic properties are guaranteed even in the case of R = 1, the coefficient estimates 
and fitted values are not stable because of the relatively small sample size. We can obtain stable 
estimates when setting the replication size to greater than five. We seldom find significant differences 
between the result with R = 5 and that with R = 20. 
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Table 5.1: Estimation Results: Cost Distribution Structural Parameters (R = 20) 
 
 
 
 
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
βEN
Constant                3.130 0.451 3.213 0.592 2.946 0.644 3.226 1.051
Load Factor              –0.376 0.180 -0.386 0.084 -0.099 0.092 -0.176 0.374
Load Factor−1 – – – – 0.525 0.091 0.483 0.138
Green Contract 0.040 0.118 0.072 0.071 0.011 0.054 0.011 0.136
Dummy for 2010 –0.037 0.262 –0.031 0.245 –0.118 0.129 –0.040 0.160
Power Demand        – – –0.004 0.033 – – –0.003 0.087
log (no. of bidders) 0.024 0.093 –0.026 0.064 0.061 0.056 –0.098 0.234
γEN
Constant                 0.668 0.103 0.490 0.073 1.027 0.110 1.517 0.111
Load Factor               1.731 0.145 1.853 0.399 1.102 0.187 0.004 0.335
log (no. of bidders) –0.619 0.130 –0.467 0.196 0.536 0.080 –0.195 0.230
βIC
Constant                 3.308 0.430 3.370 0.415 2.739 0.256 2.637 0.651
Load Factor               –1.786 0.187 –1.655 0.256 –0.712 0.070 –0.842 0.311
Load Factor−1 – – – – 1.027 0.126 0.829 0.267
Green Contract 0.036 0.361 –0.045 0.061 –0.054 0.076 –0.060 0.502
Dummy for 2010 0.131 0.117 0.089 0.161 0.101 0.078 0.054 0.402
Power Demand            – – –0.010 0.070 – – –0.001 0.084
log (no. of bidders) –0.059 0.149 0.077 0.072 –0.019 0.127 0.273 0.210
γIC
Constant                 9.564 0.235 9.950 1.269 1.709 0.254 0.930 0.322
Load Factor                –8.008 1.337 –0.007 0.083 –0.055 0.136 0.104 0.495
log (no. of bidders) –1.791 0.286 –2.227 0.470 0.017 0.157 2.094 0.624
OID (p–value)   
AIC 
Goodness of Fit                     
Winning Bid
Entrant Participation
No. of Parameters
in Auxiliary Model
in Structural Model
Model 2
High Voltage SitesUltra–High Voltage Sites
Model 1Model 2Model 1
20
45.408 45.408 45.408 45.408
0.807
0.9060.640
0.7090.715
0.878
0.700
0.850
16 18 18
2318 20 21
The mean parameter for Entrants
The variance parameter for Entrants
The mean parameter for the Incumbent
The variance parameter for the Incumbent
39.635 (0.000)5.369 (0.068)23.210 (0.000)13.709 (0.001)
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Table 5.2: Medians of Incumbent’s Estimated Cost Distributions (yen/kWh) 
Load Factor UHV Auctions HV Auctions 
30% 19.51 18.23 
40% 15.83 15.35 
50% 12.88 13.34 
60% 10.50 11.77 
Source: Based on the estimation results of Model 1 shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Our estimation results show that load factor affects log-unit supply costs negatively 
and nonlinearly, as depicted in Figure 2.1. In contrast, other variables, such as the green 
contract dummy, power demand, and the number of bidders, are not significant cost factors. 
Load factor positively affects the entrants’ cost variations while it negatively impacts upon 
the incumbent’s costs only with the UHV power supply. An increase in the number of bidders 
affects the variation in costs of both the incumbent and the entrants for the UHV power 
supply, but its impact tends to be positive and less clear for the HV power supply. 
The overidentification (OID) test in the lower part of Table 5.1 favors the specification 
of the model without the power demand variable (Model 1) to that with it (Model 2). While 
some outliers weaken the OID test results for the UHV auction sample, but which we could 
easily trim to improve the model in terms of the minimum value of the criterion function, the 
goodness-of-fit statistics indicate our model estimates are successful.13 Therefore, overall, we 
consider Model 1 to suffer no serious misspecification, and so conduct the following policy 
simulations using this model. 
Using the coefficient estimates, we reconstruct and depict the cost density functions 
                                                     
13  For the goodness-of-fit measure of the binary variable, we employ the measure of correct 
classification ratio, where we assign the value of one to the predicted dependent variable if the ratio of 
simulated auctions with entrant participation is equal to or greater than 0.5. 
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of the incumbent and entrants for the auctions in the eight market segments in 2010 (Figure 
5.1). In this figure, EN (min) is the lowest order statistic of the sample from the entrant cost 
distribution, representing the cost of the most efficient entrant, which is thus most likely to 
win among all potential entrant bidders. The peaks in EN (min) indicate the supply cost gaps 
between UHV and HV auctions with the same load factor. These gaps are attributable partly 
to the difference in transmission costs between the UHV and HV power supplies, which 
entrants pay for using the incumbent’s network. As the load factor rises, the cost 
distributions shift gradually leftward. This is most conspicuous in the incumbent’s costs and 
matches the downward-sloping curves of the winning bids depicted in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Estimated Cost Densities of the Incumbent and Entrants 
 
 
Comparing the cost distributions of the incumbent and entrants, we can identify the 
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competitiveness of these players in each market segment. In the market segments for the 
UHV power supply with load factors of 30–40%, the distributions of EN (min) are located on 
the left-hand side and overlap a little with those of the incumbent. This significant cost 
advantage enables entrants to win almost perfectly as observed in Table 2.1. In contrast, the 
cost advantage for entrants diminishes in the market segments for the HV power supply 
and/or with a high load factor. The incumbent’s cost distributions are often located to the left 
of those of the entrants, demonstrating its strong performance in supplying high load factor 
customers, whose load profile often matches that of the incumbent’s plant portfolio.14 
 
5.2 Policy Simulations 
We use the estimated structural auction model to simulate two competition-
promoting policies, namely (i) increasing the number of the potential bidders and (ii) 
introducing preferential treatment for entrants. Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) argued that 
competition-promoting policies could bring about three types of effects: a competitive effect, 
a participation effect, and a preference effect. The competitive effect refers to the changes in 
bids induced by a competition-promoting policy, which drives bidders to bid more 
aggressively to avoid being beaten. The participation effect refers to the effect on the 
participation probability of entrants, which we expect to promote competition mainly against 
the incumbent. The preference effect refers to the effect of a preferential treatment that 
causes inefficient allocation incidences by inviting and allowing inefficient (i.e., high-cost) 
                                                     
14 Incumbents are typically equipped with large baseload power plants, such as coal-fired thermal and 
nuclear plants. In contrast, entrants have not invested in sufficient own supply capacity in their short 
business history after deregulation and depend largely on third-party power supply from less fuel-
efficient plants, excess capacity in the private power supply, wholesale supply by incumbents, and 
purchases through the power exchange. 
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bidders to win. We examine the impacts of these two policy interventions through these three 
effects on bidding strategies, bidders’ profits, the probability of entrants’ participation, and 
consumer costs (equivalently, power charges). As the latter policy intervention can be 
distortionary by allowing less cost-efficient entrants to win, we estimate the allocative 
efficiency of auctions given this preferential treatment.15 
In our structural model context, these two policy interventions work as follows. While 
the incumbent always participates as the default bidder, entrants with costs lower than the 
upper bound of the incumbent’s bid b  are likely to participate in an auction. An increase in 
the number of potential bidders n promotes entrants’ participation (the participation effect). 
The incumbent reacts to this more active participation with more aggressive bids (the 
competitive effect). In particular, the incumbent’s aggressive reaction lowers b  to 
discourage entrant participation. However, the overall impact is ambiguous––whether the 
number of potential bidders n positively or negatively affects the participation probabilities 
of entrants and the resulting auction outcomes. 
The second policy intervention, the preferential treatment for entrants’ winning bids, 
can enhance the competitive effect with more aggressive incumbent’s bids against the 
preferred bids. Alternatively, we could discount entrants’ bids in the awarding process, and 
this could increase the number of bidders by inviting less cost-efficient bidders into the 
auction. When the latter preferential effect dominates the former competitive effect, 
allocative efficiency is impaired. This also needs empirical examination. 
Using the parameter estimates in Table 5.1, we identify the bidding behavior. The 
bidding strategies are for a UHV auction with a load factor of 30% (Figure 5.2) and for an HV 
auction with a load factor of 50% (Figure 5.3). In these two figures, the incumbent’s bid 
                                                     
15  Although the regulatory authority cannot directly change the number of potential bidders, we 
assume that regulatory reforms in the power market and general administrative reforms in 
procurement auctions are able to reduce the pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs and facilitate entry. 
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densities )(xh  are in the left-hand side panels, where the vertical axes indicate the bids 
(yen/kWh), and the horizontal axes the probabilities of random bids chosen by the incumbent 
in the mixed-strategy game. The bidding functions of entrants )(cb  are in the right-hand 
side panels, where the vertical axes are again the bids, and the horizontal axes the supply 
costs (yen/kWh). For example, the top left panel in Figure 5.2 shows that when n = 10 and 
the incumbent’s cost x  is at its median level (19.51 yen/kWh), indicated by the red dashed 
lines, it draws a bid between 20.09 and 21.09 yen/kWh along the density. Entrants’ bids 
generally depend on their supply costs c , as well as the incumbent’s costs x . If the entrants’ 
supply cost is at the same level, they submit a bid of 20.11 yen/kWh (the top right-hand panel 
in Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Bidding Strategies of Incumbent )(xh  and Entrants )(cb  in UHV Auctions Load 
Factor of 30% 
 
Note: The red dashed lines indicate the incumbent’s median costs (19.51 yen/kWh). 
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Figure 5.3: Bidding Strategies of Incumbent )(xh  and Entrants )(cb  in HV Auctions with 
Load Factor of 30% 
Note: The red dashed lines indicate the incumbent’s median costs (13.34 yen/kWh). 
 
In Figures 5.2 and 5.3, the entrants’ bid functions show that the incumbent will bid 
more aggressively as the number of potential bidders n increases or the preference rate   
rises. Note that the latter effect arises as long as the incumbent has an incentive to 
participate in that auction. That is, when a too-high preference rate  expels the incumbent 
from the auction, entrants will play a typical symmetric auction game among themselves in 
the region RA in Figure 3.1. 
A higher degree of competition lowers the upper bounds of the incumbent’s bid b , 
which works as a hurdle for entry and thus allows only relatively low-cost bidders to 
participate. Preferential treatment for entrants not only lowers this hurdle, but also allows 
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less cost-efficient bidders to participate. This selection effect is important for the efficiency of 
resource allocation. As Figures 5.2 and 5.3 cannot depict this outcome, we discuss it further 
in Section 5.5. 
 
5.3 Participation Probability 
 The order statistic from the estimated cost distributions indicates how many 
potential entrants would actually participate in an auction. Let  1,nkc  be the k-th smallest 
order statistic of a sample of size n−1, (i.e., the number of potential entrant bidders). When 
the order statistic  1,nkc  is less than or equal to the upper bound of the incumbent’s bid b , 
at least k entrant bidders would participate in the auction. This probability is: 
 )(}),;()1/({=),,( 11,11, cdGdFncbcknp nknk
c
c
c
c



   l , 
where )(1, cF nk   is the distribution function of the order statistic  1,nkc . We compute these 
for four typical market segments. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the participation probabilities in each market segment. 16 
Participation is active for UHV or low load factor auctions. Auctions with many participants 
are rare. Without any policy interventions, the active range is up to six participants in UHV 
auctions and up to four participants in HV auctions. The effects of the increased potential 
bidders n on the participation probabilities are most sizable in the UHV auctions with a load 
factor of 30%, which are anticipated to have four to seven bidders. For example, an increase 
of n from 10 to 15 would raise the probability that an auction has five actual entrant bidders 
by 41 percentage points. The impact of the additional five bidders on the participation 
probability would reach 17 percentage points in the UHV auction with a load factor of 50% 
                                                     
16 While we assume n = 6–10 in our model estimation depending on the market segment, we assume n 
= 10 for ease of comparison of the simulation results between different market segments. 
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and 15 percentage points in the HV auction with a load factor of 30%. We attribute these 
large effects of n to the potential cost advantage of entrants over the incumbent (additional 
bidders do not markedly contribute to increasing the participation probabilities in an auction 
that has one or two actual bidders, simply because their probabilities are often already 
saturated). However, the impact would be very low in the HV auction with a load factor of 
50% and in the UHV auction with a load factor of 50% that attracts many (six or more) 
participants. In these cases, entrant participation is negligibly small in the status quo. 
 
Figure 5.4: Participation Probabilities 
 
 
The middle and the lower panels in Figure 5.4 show that the preference rate   
positively affects the participation probability. This outcome is brought about by the 
interplay between the competitive effect and the participation effect, which are triggered by 
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the increase in  . On one hand, the incumbent would lower the upper bound of its bid b  
as a reaction to the discounted bids of entrants (the competitive effect on the incumbent’s 
bid). The incumbent’s aggressive bids cut entrants’ profit margins and thus discourage their 
participation. On the other hand, the preferential treatment affords the opportunity to 
participate in auctions for less cost-efficient entrants, who could not participate without the 
preferential treatment (the participation effect on entrants). 
While we anticipate both positive and negative influences, as shown in Figure 5.4, 
the participation effect will always dominate the competitive effect given this preferential 
treatment. For example, a 5% discount would boost the participation probability by up to 7–
12 percentage points. However, the magnitude is not uniform across all cases. For the most 
part, the probability increase will be marked only in moderately or less competitive auctions 
attracting, for example, six or fewer participants in the UHV auction with a load factor of 
30% even without the preferential treatment. In the HV auction with a load factor of 50%, 
the impact is visible only in auctions that can attract three or fewer participants without the 
treatment. We cannot expect that the policy would influence auctions with many (five to nine) 
participants. For further outreach, we require a larger discount of 20%, rather than 5%. This 
policy option makes us aware of a serious tradeoff between the participation effect and the 
distortionary effect induced by the preferential treatment, as discussed later. 
 
5.4 Profits and Consumer Costs 
The competition-promoting policies affect bidders’ profits and consumers’ costs (or 
equivalently their welfare) through the participation probabilities and winning bids. We 
provide these for the typical market segments for different numbers of potential bidders n in 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6. An increase in n (from 10 to 20) would make competition more severe 
and reduce the profits of both the incumbent and entrants in all market segments (Figure 
5.5). However, the incumbent’s profits are almost zero in the UHV auctions and thus not 
affected any further. The upward-sloping curves for “EN Total” indicate that an increase in 
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the preference rate would increase (total) profits of all entrants only in the relatively less 
competitive market segments, characterized by lower load factors, fewer potential bidders, 
and/or HV power supply. 
 
Figure 5.5: Profits of Incumbent and Entrants 
 
 
Figure 5.6 shows that an increase in n would decrease payments to winning bidders 
just as it would decrease bidders’ profits. In contrast, the impact of the preference rate   
on consumer costs is complex, especially in HV auctions, where switching among the three 
competition regimes is important. The payment to the incumbent and that to entrants in 
competition regime B (the incumbent vs. entrants) are decreasing in   because the 
incumbent’s aggressive bidding induced by the increase in   (i.e., the competitive effect) 
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plays a crucial role.17 Given that competition regime A (i.e., competition only among entrants 
without the incumbent) occurs, an increase in   would allow entrants to raise their bids by 
that much to increase payments to themselves. 
 
Figure 5.6: Consumer Costs 
 
 
The consumer costs consist of the expected payments incurred in these three 
competition regimes. Because the payments are increasing and decreasing in  , the 
consumer cost curves typically become U-shaped (see the right-hand side panels in Figure 
                                                     
17 Competition regime C, where only the incumbent participates and wins, will not arise in these four 
typical market segments given our assumed parameters and the estimated model. 
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5.6). For an auction with a load factor of 50% and n = 10, the optimal   that minimizes its 
consumer costs is approximately 10%. Although the reduction in consumer costs by 
controlling   is very small (less than 1 yen/kWh) in highly competitive UHV auctions, it 
can be sizable (about 2–3 yen/kWh) in less competitive auctions. We can draw the same 
conclusion for social costs, being the sum of consumer costs and profits. 
 
5.5 Inefficient Allocation 
Inefficient allocation could emerge in both regions RA (entrants vs. entrants) and RB 
(incumbent vs. entrants) in Figure 3.1. When an entrant has a cost in region RB, inefficient 
allocation can occur in two forms: (1) the incumbent bids too aggressively and defeats the 
lowest-cost entrant ( 1 > Bc c R ), and (2) the incumbent with the lowest-cost bids too 
passively and thus defeated by an entrant with higher costs ( BRcc <1 ). The probabilities 
of these are denoted as Bp  and Bp , respectively, and written as follows: 
 ],[],,[)()(1
)(= 111 }1,{min cccbccdGcdF
cbHp B
c
c
c
cB







   , 
 ],[],,[)()(1
)(1= 111 cccbccdGcdF
cbHp iB
b
c
c
cB












   . 
Inefficient allocation can also occur if the preferred entrants have higher costs (but in region 
RA) than the incumbent ( 1 < Ac c R ) and win. This probability is: 
 ].,[],,[)()(= 111 cccbccdGcdFp c
c
cA
   
The larger the preference rate   is, the greater is the cost threshold  . Then, the 
winning probability of the preferred entrant increases, irrespective of the incumbent’s cost 
level. The total probability that the most efficient bidder is defeated is the sum of the above 
three terms (Figure 5.7). Given our sample and estimated model, we find inefficient allocation 
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would be caused mostly by the too passive bidding of the incumbent Bp  and the too 
aggressive bidding of the entrants Ap . 
We could mitigate this inefficient allocation by increasing the number of potential 
bidders n and using a reasonably low preference rate   (0–10%) that makes the incumbent 
aggressive. Notably, the latter implies that the inefficiency curve has a bliss point within a 
reasonable range of the preference rate while Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) concluded that 
an increase in the preference rate would always increase inefficiency. This may well reflect 
the unique context of the regulatory reform that commenced recently in the Japanese retail 
market. Here, the incumbent (TEPCO) faced very little competition before and in the early 
stage of retail market deregulation and thus could sacrifice large rents as a reaction to entry. 
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Figure 5.7: Probability of Realizing Inefficient Allocation 
 
Note: Ap  is the probability that an entrant with a higher cost in the region RA wins because 
of preferential treatment; Bp  is the probability that an entrant with a higher cost in the 
region RB wins because of preferential treatment and a passive bid by the incumbent; and 
Bp  is the probability that entrants with a lower cost in the region RB lose because of an 
aggressive bid by the incumbent. 
 
As a bliss point exists, we could improve allocative efficiency by fine-tuning the 
preference rate for each market segment. In HV auctions with a high load factor, we could 
set the preference rate at 1.6–2.4% to lower the probability of inefficiency by 2.4–4.8 
percentage points (compared with the case without any preferential treatment). We now find 
two different bliss points. In the HV auctions with a 50% load factor, this loss-minimizing 
preference rate is much lower than the consumer cost-minimizing preference rate, which is 
around 10%. The gap between these two optimal preference rates indicates a need for a 
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second-best policy option that manages the tradeoff between efficiency and consumer costs. 
However, in other market segments, the optimal preference rate should be (practically) zero, 
such that market intervention through a preference program would always incur efficiency 
losses. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper developed a structural auction model and quantitatively examined the 
effects of policy measures to enhance competition in the Japanese retail power market. We 
used the theoretical model in Martínez-Pardina (2006) with asymmetries between an 
incumbent and entrants in both the cost distributions and information structure. We 
explicitly generated simulation-based solutions of the model as a form of the participation 
decision of new entrants and the bidding functions of participants. We then matched these 
to observations of the participation states and winning bids through the auxiliary model in 
the indirect inference method. This method enabled us to obtain structural parameter 
estimates with a reasonable goodness of fit. 
Our estimation results showed significant cost gaps between the incumbent and 
entrants in HV auctions with high load factors, where entrants do not participate actively 
owing to their cost disadvantages. The cost gaps at the same time encourage entrants to 
choose carefully the profitable market segments in which to participate. These are mostly 
UHV auctions with low load factors. 
Based upon the estimated model, we conducted counterfactual simulations and found 
that an increase in potential bidders would raise participation probabilities in market 
segments with active participation and discourage entrant participation in market segments 
with inactive participation. This is because the preferential treatment for entrants would 
induce aggressive bidding by the incumbent that would prevent further participation by 
entrants. Such competition-promoting policies would then result in moderate reductions in 
consumer costs. 
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We also found that we could alleviate inefficient resource allocation caused by too 
aggressive or passive bidding behavior by setting the preference rate at 2–3% for HV auctions 
or by increasing the number of potential bidders. Nonetheless, about 10% of these auctions 
would continue to suffer from inefficient allocation. In contrast, we could minimize consumer 
costs with a modest preference rate. It is noteworthy that this consumer cost-minimizing 
preference rate is higher than the inefficiency-minimizing rate, suggesting a tradeoff between 
the two policy targets. 
Further elaborations are possible by introducing uncertainty about the number of 
potential bidders (e.g., An et al. (2010) and Shneyerov and Wong (2011)) and unobserved 
heterogeneity into their cost distributions (e.g., Campo et al. (2003)). We could also carry out 
semi/nonparametric estimation of deep structural parameters, as described in Li and Zheng 
(2009) and Suzuki (2011). Other factors, such as bidder supply capacity and its uses for 
auctions before they participate in an auction, and bidders who won in the previous year, 
may also affect bidding behavior. We could investigate all these effects by considering the 
dynamic behavior of bidders (e.g., Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003)) in future work. 
 
  Page 43 
Acknowledgements 
 We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions by Ayako Suzuki. This 
research was partly supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science through 
KAKENHI Grant No. 17K18559 and the Policy Research Center of the National Graduate 
Institute for Policy Studies. 
 
References 
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (2004) “Denryoku-kyokyu-kosuto-tou-ni-kansuru 
Chosa [A Survey on Power Supply Costs],” the Government of Japan, Tokyo. (in 
Japanese) 
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (2006) “Seidokaikaku-Hyouka Shouiinkai 
Houkokusho [Report Compiled by the Working Group for the Institutional Reforms],” 
the Government of Japan, Tokyo. (in Japanese) 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (2015) “Annual Report on the Results of 
Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas Markets in 2014,” Council of 
European Energy Regulators. 
 http://www.acer.europa.eu/official_documents/acts_of_the_agency/publication/acer_
market_monitoring_report_2015.pdf (Accessed on September 13, 2018) 
An, Y., Hu, Y., Shum, M. (2010) “Estimating First–price Auctions with an Unknown Number 
of Bidders: A Misclassification Approach,” Journal of Econometrics 157 (2): 328–341. 
Barigozzi, M., Halbleib, R., Veredas, D. (2015) “Which Model to Match?” Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986419. 
Brendstrup, B., and Paarsch, H. J. (2004) “Nonparametric Estimation of Dutch and First-
price, Sealed-bid Auction Models with Asymmetric Bidders,” Econometric Society 
2004 North American Summer Meetings 39, Econometric Society 
(http://paarsch.biz.uiowa.edu/download/dutch.pdf). 
Campo, S., Perrigne, I. M., Vuong, Q. H. (2003) “Asymmetry in First–Price Auctions with 
  Page 44 
Affiliated Private Values,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 13 (2): 179–207. 
Chernozhukov, V., Hong, H. (2003) “An MCMC Approach to Classical Estimation,” Journal 
of Econometrics 115: 293–346. 
Corfe, S., Gicheva, N. (2017) Concentration not Competition: the State of UK Consumer 
Markets, Social Market Foundation, London, UK. 
 http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Concentration-not-
competition.pdf (accessed on August 29, 2019) 
Doornik, J. A. (2010) Object-oriented Matrix Programming Using Ox, Timberlake 
Consultants Press and Oxford: www.doornik.com. Third edition. 
Electricity and Gas Market Surveillance Commission (2018) “Denryoku-shijo-ni-okeru 
Kyoso-jokyo-no-hyoka [Evaluation of Competition in the Electricity Markets],” 
Government of Japan, Tokyo. (in Japanese) 
 https://www.emsc.meti.go.jp/activity/emsc/pdf/077_03_02.pdf (accessed on August 31, 
2019) 
Fibich, G., and Gavish, N. (2011) “Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions,” 
Games and Economic Behavior 73: 479–495. 
Fu, X., Le, Z., Wang, K., Yan, J. (2015) “Low Cost Carrier Competition and Route Entry in 
an Emerging but Regulated Aviation Market–The Case of China,” Transportation 
Research Part A 79: 3–16. 
Gallant, R. A., Tauchen, G. (1996) “Which Moments to Match?,” Econometric Theory 12 (4): 
657–681. 
Goffe, W. L., Ferrier, G. D. (1994) “Global Optimization of Statistical Functions with 
Simulated Annealing,” Journal of Econometrics 60 (1–2): 65–99. 
Gourieroux, C., Monfort, A., Renault, E. (1993) “Indirect Inference,” Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 8: S85–S118. 
Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., Vuong, Q. (2000) “Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First–Price 
Auctions,” Econometrica 68 (3): 525–574. 
  Page 45 
Hattori, T. (2010) “Determinants of the Number of Bidders in the Competitive Procurement 
of Electricity Supply Contracts in the Japanese Public Sector,” Energy Economics 36 
(2): 1299–1305. 
Heckman, J. J., Singer, B. (1984) “A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distributional 
Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data,” Econometrica 52 (2): 271–
320. 
Hickman, B. R., and Hubbard, T. P. (2015) “Replacing Sample Trimming with Boundary 
Correction in Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions,” Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 30 (5): 739–762. 
Hosoe, N. (2015) “Nuclear Power Plant Shutdown and Alternative Power Plant Installation 
Scenarios: A Nine-Region Spatial Equilibrium Analysis of the Electric Power Market 
in Japan,” Energy Policy 86: 416–432. 
Hosoe, N., Takagi, S. (2012) “Retail Power Market Competition with Endogenous Entry 
Decision: An Auction Data Analysis,” Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies 26 (3): 351–368. 
Hubbard, T. P., Paarsch, H. J. (2009) “Investigating Bid Preferences at Low-price, Sealed-bid 
Auctions with Endogenous Participation,” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 27 (1): 1–14. 
Jofre-Bonet, M., Pesendorfer, M. (2003) “Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game,” 
Econometrica 71 (5): 1443–1489. 
Kormilitsina, A., Nekipelov, D. (2012) “Approximation Properties of Laplace-Type 
Estimators,” in: Balke, N., Canova, F., Milani, F., Wynne, M. A. (eds.) DSGE Models 
in Macroeconomics: Estimation, Evaluation, and New Developments (Advances in 
Econometrics, Volume 28), Emerald, pp. 291–318. 
Krasnokutskaya, E., Seim, K. (2011) “Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway 
Procurement,” American Economic Review 101(6): 2653–2686. 
Levin, D., Smith, J. L. (1994) “Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry,” American Economic 
  Page 46 
Review 84 (3): 585–599. 
Li, T., Zhang, B. (2015) “Affiliation and Entry in First-Price Auctions with Heterogeneous 
Bidders: An Analysis of Merger Effects,” American Economic Journal: 
Microeconomics 7 (2): 188–214. 
Li, T., Zheng, X. (2009) “Entry and Competition Effects in First–Price Auctions: Theory and 
Evidence from Procurement Auctions,” Review of Economics Studies 76: 1397–1429. 
Martínez-Pardina, I. (2006) “First–price Auctions Where One of the Bidders’ Valuations is 
Common Knowledge,” Review of Economic Design 10: 31–51. 
R Development Core Team (2010) R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing, 
R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. 
Rossi, E., and Santucci de Magistris, P. (2018) “Indirect Inference with Time Series Observed 
with Error,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 33 (6): 874–897. 
Shneyerov, A., Wong, A. C. L. (2011) “Identification in First–Price and Dutch Auctions when 
the Number of Potential Bidders is Unobservable,” Games and Economic Behavior 
72 (2): 1–15. 
Sun, J. Y. (2017) “Airline Deregulation and its Impacts on Air Travel Demand and Airline 
Competition: Evidence from Korea,” Review of Industrial Organization 51: 343–380. 
Suzuki, A. (2010) “Asymmetric Bidding and Participation between Incumbents and Entrants 
in Electric Power Procurement Auctions,” mimeo. 
 http://wakame.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/~riron/Workshop/2011/20110714.pdf (accessed on 
January 14, 2016) 
Vickrey, W. (1961) “Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal 
of Finance 16 (1): 8–37. 
 
  Page 47 
Appendix: Alternative Specifications 
There are several options for specifying the estimation model: one is the specification 
of the bidders’ cost distribution functions, and another is the variable selection in the 
structural model. We discuss these alternative specifications in our analysis. 
We used a log-normal cost distribution in the main text but could also specify other 
distributions, for example, the beta distribution. The beta distribution is a flexible 
distribution with only two parameters, which determine not only the first two moments but 
also the signs of skewness. However, it is difficult to relate the exogenous variables with 
moments of bidders’ cost in the case of beta distributions, compared to the log-normal 
distributions in the main text. This also makes the interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients less straightforward. 
Nevertheless, we tried a specification for the exponential of the linear index of 
exogenous variables for each parameter in the beta distribution, Betaሺα, βሻ. The minimized 
value of the criterion function using the beta distribution is 154.92 for ultra-high voltage sites, 
whereas that using the log-normal distribution with a comparable specification is 71.152 
(Table A.1). This suggests that a model with a beta distribution is clearly inferior to one with 
a log-normal distribution in terms of both interpretability and the overall goodness of fit. 
Therefore, all reported estimation and simulation results employ the log-normal distribution. 
The next issue is variable selection, which matters especially in the specification of 
the load factor variable and the inclusion of the number of actual bidders (see Section 4.1). 
In Table A.1, we report the estimation results with and without the quadratic load factor 
term in the means excluding the number of actual bidders. Compared with the results in 
Table 5.1, we mostly observe negative and significant effects of the load factor variables and 
the significance of the time dummy variables. However, the goodness of fit of each dependent 
variable in the last two rows of Table A.1 are inferior to the corresponding values in Table 
5.1, except the column providing Model 1 for the HV auctions. The key features of the 
specification in Table 5.1 are the inclusion of the inverse term for the load factor and the 
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actual number of bidders, which help capture the rapidly decreasing trend in winning bids 
alongside the load factor and the unobserved auction-specific factor through the variance, as 
discussed in Section 4.1. These specifications are helpful to improve the goodness-of fit of 
each dependent variable (the last two rows in Tables 5.1 and A.1). 
 
Table A.1: Alternative Model Specification 
 
 
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
βEN
Constant                 3.270 0.715 * 3.138 0.356 * 3.045 0.408 * 3.447 0.206 * 3.267 0.492 * 3.240 0.332 *
Load Factor               –0.576 0.202 * –0.694 0.356 –0.566 0.133 * –0.807 0.057 * –0.791 0.194 * –0.751 0.222 *
Load Factor2 0.756 0.259 * 1.199 0.166 * 0.659 0.437 0.772 0.183 *
Green Contract –0.117 0.403 0.082 0.099 0.126 0.334 –0.143 0.062 * 0.045 0.212 0.062 0.176
Dummy for 2010 –0.098 0.062 0.261 0.098 * 0.227 0.143 –0.032 0.176 0.243 0.086 * 0.224 0.300
Power Demand –0.088 0.128 –0.033 0.266
γEN
Constant                 0.661 0.262 * 0.297 0.154 0.544 0.100 * 0.607 1.579 0.737 0.233 * 3.325 0.393 *
Load Factor               –0.367 0.040 * 0.364 0.084 * –0.261 0.333 –0.540 0.133 * 0.329 0.175 1.077 0.427 *
Dummy for 2010 –0.298 0.236 –0.118 2.899
Power Demand 0.034 0.162 –0.137 0.108
βIC
Constant                 2.860 1.189 * 2.997 0.404 * 3.108 0.406 * 2.944 0.484 3.275 1.112 * 3.325 0.393 *
Load Factor               –1.276 0.367 * –1.361 0.135 * –1.205 0.276 * –1.631 0.495 –1.877 0.442 * –1.849 0.602 *
Load Factor2 –0.291 0.228 –1.031 0.237 * –0.192 0.312 –0.406 0.139 *
Green Contract –0.145 1.317 0.054 0.143 –0.021 0.117 0.245 0.009 0.027 0.293 0.008 0.142
Dummy for 2010 0.260 0.227 –0.512 0.237 * –0.407 0.113 * 0.108 1.151 –0.702 0.388 –0.609 0.162 *
Power Demand 0.045 0.351 0.009 0.243
γIC
Constant                 0.171 0.879 6.162 1.199 * 6.972 1.925 * 0.307 0.079 * 3.918 1.301 * –1.981 0.451 *
Load Factor               –0.288 1.291 –5.721 1.163 * –6.186 0.843 * -0.566 0.159 * –2.791 1.271 * –7.112 2.357 *
Dummy for 2010 –0.127 0.934 -0.208 0.204
Power Demand 0.047 0.217 5.994 0.993 *
Goodness of Fit  
Winning Bid
Entrant Participation 0.691 0.786
Ultra–High Voltage Sites High Voltage Sites
Model B
71.152 (0.000) 128.47 (0.000)48.182 (0.000)
0.836
0.684
0.633
0.625
43.72 (0.000) 29.97 (0.000)63.343 (0.000)
0.781
0.641 0.796
Model C
The mean parameter for Entrants
The variance parameter for Entrants
The mean parameter for the Incumbent
The variance parameter for the Incumbent
Model A Model B Model C Model A
0.796
0.704
0.672
